KNU/KNDO & The Beginning of Karen-Burmese War

KNU/KNDO

As a result of growing Karen nationalism and to effectively respond to the perceived or real threats from the Burmese majority the Karen National Union (KNU) was formed in 1947 by bringing together various Karen groups mainly from the Delta and other Karen domiciles on the eastern border lands. The well-known English-educated lawyer and Karen politician Saw Ba Oo Gyi was the first president of KNU.

Saw Ba Oo Gyi (1905-1950).

Born in Bassein in 1905 to a wealthy landlord and after completing a law degree in Rangoon University in 1925 and later in London Saw Ba Oo Gyi became a lawyer and was called to the English Bar two years later. He was the Minister of Revenue in the pre-war colonial Government in 1937. He became the Minister of Information from 1946 to February 1947 and then Minister of Transport in Aung San’s AFPFL Government before resigning in April 1947.

His major aims of forming the Karen Nation Union in 1947 were to represent unified Karen interests in post-independence Burma and to call on the British to allow the Karens their own state. This translated extract is from the book “The Insurgency - Volume I” published by the Myanmar Ministry of Information in 1990.

“After Aung San-Attlee Agreement was signed the representatives from all the Karen organizations sat together at a Karen conference on 4^thFebruary 1947. The conference rejected the Agreement.

Their reasons were that in the Agreement there were no Karen representative on the Burmese side, only few Karen members in the proposed Constituent Assembly, no separate Karen Battalions, no separate Karen State, and no consultations with any Karen.

The Karen National Union was formed on 6^th April 1947 by combining KCO (Karen Central Organization), BKNA (Burma, Karen National Association), KYO (Karen Youth Organization), and KNA (Karen National Association). And on 16^th April 1947, only 10 days after KNU’s formation the armed wing KNDO (Karen National Defense Organization) was initiated.”

Even though the Karens by then had guaranteed minority rights in the form of 22 reserved seats in the Legislative Council the main purpose of KNU was to press the departing British colonial government to establish a Karen state separated from soon-to-be independent Burma.

But the KNU had faced a serious hurdle since the formation as the Karen Youth Organization (KYO) did not really agree with KNU in their demand for separate nationhood. This extract is from the book “The Karen Revolution in Burma” by Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung.

“However, Josef Silverstein correctly points out that the public expressions of the Karens made it clear that they were less united in their demands for an autonomous state, being divided on its size, location, and relationship with Burma proper.

Specifically, two prominent Karen political organizations, the KYO and the KNU, were divided over the degree of political, economic, and cultural autonomy that would be enjoyed by the Karen state, as well as their territorial boundaries.

Formed in 1945 as the youth wing of the Karen Central Organization (KCO), the KYO advocated accommodation with the Burmese state and expressed willingness to compromise on issues related to the status and extent of any Karen state.

On the other hand, the KNU, formed in 1947 as an umbrella organization to represent all Karen groups, wanted to include the Irrawaddy Division and the Insein and Hanthawaddy Districts into the Karen state. The areas claimed by the KNU amounted to around one-third of Burma’s territories.

In the early days of Burma’s independence there were a number of high ranking government officials and ordinary Karens, both Buddhists and Christians, who, like the majority of  leading members of the KYO, did not join the (KNU/KNDO’s) armed resistance movement.”

Since the Karen-Burmese riots in 1942 most Karen villages armed themselves and started forming various village defense units. Combining these splintered forces together in 1947 the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) was formed as the armed wing of KNU. By 1949 the well-armed KNDO troops at least 10,000 strong were right on the doorsteps of Rangoon and the Burmese public didn’t like it at all.

The Beginning of Karen-Burmese War

Even though Kyaw Nyein and U Nu didn’t really want to fight the racial war Ne Win badly needed an all-out Karaen-Burmese war to rid of his boss General Smith Dun and cleanse the army of all the Karens. So while U Nu was eagerly trying to resolve the dangerous standstill by frantic negotiations with KNU’s Saw Ba Oo Gyi Ne Win launched an all-out attack on the KNDO positions in Rangoon.

This edited extract is from the book “Memoirs of the Four-Foot Colonel” by General Smith Dun the first Commander-in-Chief of post-war Burmese Army and a loyal Karen.

“But, still almost incredible, Saw Ba U Gyi at the risk of losing his leadership with his people pleaded for patience and forbearance as reported by his broadcast over the Rangoon radio for restraint and patience.

But alas, the last day of the first month of the New Year 1949 brought the last senseless act of brutality which set the Karens in open warfare with the Burmese Government. The day passed peacefully but not the night. Soon after midnight of the 31^st, the Burmese troops surrounded the Ahlone Karen Quarters and awoke the sleepers with machine gun and mortar fires.

At the same time scores of houses were set ablaze. This slaughter of unarmed women and children continued for over two hours. By daylight a large portion of this Karen Quarter was reduced to ashes. Survivors were herded into the so-called refuge camp for safety and behind the barbed wires.

Meanwhile at 0700 hours on 31^st January 1949 a Burmese soldier patrolling the Thamaing Karen Quarters fired three shots at a young Karen serviceman on a bus moving away from him. Evidently these three shots were a signal for a general attack on the Karen Quarters, because these three shots were immediately followed by a full blast of mortar, machine gun and rifle fire from the main detachment of Burmese Government troops stationed not 300 yards away.  

An all-out attack on Thamaing Karen Quarters was on, and thus began the full-scale war that has been going on ever since between the Karens and the Burmese Government.”

This extract is from the draft book of Colonel Maung Maung who then was the CO of Fifth Burma Rifles and later promoted to become the CO of Burmese Army’s Northern Division when the former CO Bo Kyaw Zaw was moved to Southern Division to fight the Insein Battle.

“It was Ne Win exhibiting a lot of ‘macho dare’ in military matters, as against wimpy Bo Let Ya hopelessly dependent on the advice of the British Services Military Mission (giving naturally adverse advice and plans of operations to keep themselves in control and help the insurgents Karens) who started anti- KNDO operations.

He had only 3 or 4 UMP battalions and his attack of Karen stronghold at Thamaing started the open insurrection of the madly anti-Burman and British loyalist KNDO groups openly concentrating in Insein Baptist Seminary and in Karen compounds near by areas, as at the Thamaing road junction with main Rangoon-Isnein road.

It was on 31 January 1949 that Ne Win made his move and led the attack at Thamaing junction dug in KNDO position and sent 2 UMP battalions to Seminary hill area and Insein town.”

What Ne Win did not realize was the KNDO forces were much stronger and more heavily-armed than the lightly-armed UMP battalions he had at the beginning of the Battle of Insein. Also to make his position more difficult all three Karen Rifles had mutinied and by the end of January the First Karen Rifles from Taungoo and the Second Karen from Prome were marching down towards Rangoon to help the KNDO troops digging-in at Insein. So General Smith Dun had to resign over the mutiny of all Karen Rifles Battalions.

General Ne Win (1911-2002).

Ne Win’s aim was now achieved as Smith Dun and all Karen troops were thus permanently out of the army and he was quickly promoted to Commander-in-Chief on 1^st February 1949. But he never really was a competent field commander and once he ran into the solid wall of KNDO resistance at Insein he just broke down and gave up and U Nu and Kyaw Nyein finally had to fight the nasty race war he started. This extract is from the draft book of Colonel Maung Maung.

“In less than a month of directing this operations personally without the usual all staff conference and field commanders he (Ne Win) gave up and went to Prime Minister Thakin Nu and apologized for his failure and asked to be relieved of command and also to negotiate with insurgent BCP and install Thakin Than Tun and communist as government of Burma.

It was a complete loss of confidence in himself. Luckily U Nu was made of strong stuff and decided that he would lead the country back to normal and defeat the insurgents (Karens and Communists) by mobilizing the entire country behind the AFPFL.”  

The mutinies of some Burmese Rifles and all Karen Rifles basically decimated Burmese army. Only less than three thousand infantry was left in the Burmese Army in the beginning of 1949. But it was rapidly rebuilt to fight the escalating civil war. And Kyaw Nyein had bought too many Indian rifles to sit idle in the warehouses.

Responding to U Nu’s and Kyaw Nyein’s calls to the arms against Karens thousands and thousands of patriotic Burmese men and youths filled the rapidly-formed army and paramilitary units armed with cheap Indian rifles and they would eventually become the core of the staunch anti-ethnic, brutally-racist army that would rule Burma with iron fist till today.

One of the volunteers is young Than Shwe who many years later would become the Senior General and Dictator of Burma. Only 16 years old when he joined the First Infantry Battalion as a private and later rose through the ranks. He is the typical of military hardliners who by their bitter experiences from those brutal days simply believe the only way to maintain their Union of Burma was by force.